“The IAA for Fiscal Year 2021 represents the Senate Intelligence Committee’s strong, bipartisan effort to give our Intelligence Community the resources, authorities, and personnel to protect America’s national security while increasing government efficiency,” Acting Chairman Marco Rubio said. “As a nation, we face ever-expanding threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Our legislation is vital to the Intelligence Community, and it provides the men and women who serve our nation the tools they need to keep our country safe. At the same time, our bill represents comprehensive Congressional oversight, ensuring that these tools are executed responsibly and cost-effectively.”

“This bipartisan intelligence authorization bill ensures that the women and men of our intelligence agencies have the resources they need to do their jobs,” said Vice Chairman Mark Warner. “This bill takes key steps to improve our national security, including investments in 5G technology, reforms to our security clearance process, and important protections for whistleblowers to report wrongdoing within the IC.”

The IAA for Fiscal Year 2021 ensures that the Intelligence Community can continue its critical work for our country while Congress continues its oversight, including in the following key areas:

• Confronting our adversaries’ attempts to compromise telecommunications and cybersecurity technology;
• Development and deployment of secure 5G networks based in open-standards to compete with our adversaries;
• Identifying corruption, influence operations, and information suppression by the Chinese government, in particular in this critical time for the people of Hong Kong;
• Uncovering Russian and Eastern European oligarchs’ corruption and illegal activities;
• Protecting against foreign influence threats and election interference on social media platforms;
• Creating Intelligence Community-wide policies to facilitate sharing cleared contractor information with private companies to enhance the effectiveness of insider threat programs;
• Requiring the publication of guidelines for granting, denying, or revoking a security clearance and preventing the revocation or denial of a clearance for reasons of discrimination, political beliefs, or retaliation; and
• Advancing Intelligence Community hiring flexibilities, student loan repayment programs, and child care for IC personnel.

Source: U.S. Senate

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Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am here because I have been nominated to lead the extraordinary men and women at the Central Intelligence Agency – men and women who are our country’s silent warriors. These dedicated professionals spend much of their careers in difficult, far-flung outposts of the globe, striving to make our fellow Americans more secure at home. It has been the privilege of my professional life to be one of those CIA officers.

Now, I have been asked by President Trump to lead this workforce and to continue the work that Mike Pompeo and I began a little more than a year ago: ensuring that CIA is postured to meet the complex challenges our nation faces. Those challenges include a changing but still lethal threat from terrorist groups; a nuclear threat against the continental United States from a rogue state; destabilizing Iranian adventurism; an aggressive and sometimes brutal Russia; and the long-term implications of China’s ambitions on the global stage.

While these challenges are daunting and offer few easy answers, I am confident the United States and the American people have the resolve to meet them head on. If I am confirmed as Director, you have my solemn commitment that I will position this Agency to provide the intelligence support our country needs to meet the challenges of today, and those of the future.

I welcome the opportunity to introduce myself to the American people for the first time – it is a new experience for me as I spent over 30 years under cover and in the shadows. I don’t have any social media accounts, but otherwise I think you will find me to be a typical middle class American – one with a strong sense of right and wrong and one who loves this country.

I was born in Kentucky, and while my family has deep roots there, I was an Air Force “brat” and followed my father to postings all over the world. My childhood overseas instilled in me an appreciation for foreign languages and cultures, but also a deep understanding of the vital role of American leadership in confronting aggression abroad.

I joined the CIA in 1985 as an operations officer in the Clandestine Service. From my first days in training, I had a knack for the nuts and bolts of my profession. I excelled in finding and acquiring secret information that I obtained in brush passes, dead drops, or in meetings in dusty back allies of third world capitals. I recall my first foreign agent meeting was on a dark, moonless night with an agent I’d never met before. When I picked him up, he passed me the intelligence and I passed him extra money for the men he led. It was the beginning of an adventure I had only dreamed of.

The men who ran CIA in those days leaned forward in giving me the right opportunities to succeed or fail. When a very tough, old school leader announced that I was his pick to be Chief of Station in a small but important frontier post, a few competitors complained to me directly “why would they send you?” I owe that leader much for believing in me at a time when few women were given these opportunities. While I could have done without the long nights, sleeping on the floor of my station, I was proud of the work we did there including the successful capture of two major terrorists, a counterproliferation operation that went our way, and the dismantlement of a local terrorist cell.

Altogether, I have served seven tours in the field—four as Chief of Station—including hardship assignments in distant posts and, more recently, in the capital of a major US ally.

By any standard, my life at the Agency – and it has been my life – has exceeded all of my expectations, from that January day when I took my oath to today. There were few senior women leading at CIA in those days, and we are stronger now because that picture is changing. I did my part – quietly and through hard work – to break down those barriers. And I was proud to be the first woman to serve as the number-two in the Clandestine Service. It is not my way to trumpet the fact that I am a woman up for the top job, but I would be remiss in not remarking on it – not least because of the outpouring of support from young women at CIA who consider it a good sign for their own prospects.

My experience and success as an operations officer led to three leadership positions in the Clandestine Service, and one year ago, I was asked to serve as Deputy Director of CIA. The reaction of the workforce to a rare nomination of one of their own to be Director – someone who has been in the trenches with them – has been overwhelming. I am humbled by their confidence that I can successfully lead this Agency and inspired to work harder than ever to maintain that mutual trust.

They know that I don’t need time to learn the business of what CIA does. I know CIA like the back of my hand. I know them, I know the threats we face, and I know what we need to be successful in our mission.

I have played a leading role this past year in setting us on the right path and I intend on continuing on that path if I am confirmed as Director.

Our strategy starts with strengthening our core business: collecting intelligence to help policymakers protect our country and advance American interests around the globe. It includes raising our investment against the most difficult intelligence gaps, putting more officers in the foreign field where our adversaries are, and emphasizing foreign language excellence. And, finally, it involves investing in our partnerships – both within the US Government and around the globe.

We must do everything we can to follow through on these investments and to make CIA as effective as it can possibly be, because the American people deserve no less than CIA’s best effort.

This is especially true when it comes to confronting threats from North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China. Today, CIA officers are deployed across the globe, sometimes at significant personal risk, collecting critical human and technical intelligence. I have spent my entire career driving operations and, if confirmed, I will be able to leverage that experience against these hard targets beginning on day one.

I knew that accepting the president’s nomination would raise questions about CIA classified activities and my career at the Agency. I also understand that it is important for the American people to get to know me so they are able to judge my fitness for this position. So over the last few weeks, we have leaned forward to make more information about my professional record public. We have also shared details on every aspect of my career through classified channels with this Committee, as well as with the rest of the Senate.

I think it is important to recall the context of those challenging times immediately following 9/11. For me, I had just returned to Washington from an overseas posting and I reported for duty the morning of 9/11. I knew in my gut when I saw the video of the first plane hitting the Tower in Manhattan that it was Bin Ladin. I got up from my desk and, like many others, walked over to the Counterterrorism Center and volunteered to help. I didn’t leave for three years. We worked seven days a week, and I even had friends who postponed weddings and having babies. The men and women of CIA were driven to prevent another attack. The first boots on the ground in Afghanistan were my colleagues. The first US casualty in Afghanistan was a CIA officer and it was CIA who identified and captured the mastermind of 9/11 in a brilliant operation. I am proud of our work during that time. The hard lessons we learned from that experience inform my leadership of CIA today.

In light of my counterterrorism experience, I understand that what many people around the country want to know about are my views on CIA’s former detention and interrogation program. I have views on this issue, and I want to be clear. Having served in that tumultuous time, I can offer you my personal commitment, clearly and without reservation, that under my leadership CIA will not restart such a detention and interrogation program.

CIA has learned some tough lessons, especially when asked to tackle missions that fall outside our expertise. For me, there is no better example of implementing lessons learned than what the Agency took away from the detention and interrogation program. In retrospect it is clear, as the SSCI Majority Report concludes, that CIA was not prepared to conduct a detention and interrogation program.

Today, the US Government has a clear legal and policy framework that governs detentions and interrogations. Specifically, the law provides that no individual in US custody may be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual. I fully support the standards for detainee treatment required by law, and just as importantly, I will keep CIA focused on our collection and analysis missions that can best leverage the expertise found at the Agency.

Like I said, we learned important lessons following 9/11. As both a career intelligence officer and an American citizen, I am a strong believer in the importance of oversight. Simply put, experience has taught us that CIA cannot be effective without the people’s trust. And we cannot hope to earn that trust without the accountability that comes with Congressional oversight.

If we can’t share aspects of our secret work with the public, we should do so with their elected representatives. For CIA, oversight is a vital link to the open society we defend. It’s a defining feature of the US Intelligence Community, and one of the many things that distinguishes us from the hostile services we face in the field.

If confirmed as Director, I will uphold the Agency’s obligations to Congress and ensure that oversight works on behalf of the American people.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the Committee for the hard work that is put into the oversight process, and for the vital support that you provide to my fellow officers.

CIA has given a lot to me over the past three decades—a calling in service to my country, some real-life adventures, and the profound satisfaction of serving with some of the most talented and honorable men and women anyone could ever meet.

If confirmed, I hope to repay the debt I owe to this remarkable Agency by drawing on my experience. I know what my fellow officers need from me and, I know what our nation needs from CIA—truth, integrity, and courage.

Again, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to sit before you today, and I look forward to your questions.

Source: CIA

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I was asked to testify today to describe for you my interactions with President-Elect and President Trump on subjects that I understand are of interest to you. I have not included every detail from my conversations with the President, but, to the best of my recollection, I have tried to include information that may be relevant to the Committee.

Read Comey’s full prepared remarks here.

Source: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

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“I have long believed that data is too insecure, and feel strongly that consumers have a right to seek solutions that protect their information – which involves strong encryption,” said Chairman Burr.  “I do not believe, however, that those solutions should be above the law. I am hopeful that this draft will start a meaningful and inclusive debate on the role of encryption and its place within the rule of law.  Based on initial feedback, I am confident that the discussion has begun.  We remain eager to sit down and discuss a way forward with all who are willing to engage constructively on this critically important and challenging issue.”

“No entity or individual is above the law,” said Vice Chairman Feinstein. “The bill we have drafted would simply provide that, if a court of law issues an order to render technical assistance or provide decrypted data, the company or individual would be required to do so. Today, terrorists and criminals are increasingly using encryption to foil law enforcement efforts, even in the face of a court order. We need strong encryption to protect personal data, but we also need to know when terrorists are plotting to kill Americans.”

The discussion draft legislation is available here.

Compliance with Court Orders Act of 2016

The bill ensures that everyone must comply with court orders to protect America from criminals and terrorists.

• Sense of Congress.  The bill establishes that:

• No one is above the law.  Court order recipients must comply with the rule of law.
• Providers of communications services and products should protect United States persons’ privacy with strong data security while still complying with court orders and other legal requirements.

• Covered Entities are subject to the bill’s requirements. Covered Entities include device manufacturers, software manufacturers, electronic communication services, remote communication services, providers of wire or electronic communication services, providers of remote communication services, or any person who provides a product or method to facilitate a communication or to process or store data.

• Covered Entities must provide information or data.  Covered entities that receive a court order for information or data for the investigation or prosecution of specified serious crimes must provide it to the government in an intelligible format or provide the technical assistance necessary to do so.

• Covered entities are responsible only for the information or data that they (or another party on their behalf) have made unintelligible.

• Covered entities shall be compensated for the reasonably necessary costs incurred in providing the intelligible data or required technical assistance.

• The government cannot require or prohibit any specific design or operating system for any covered entity to use in complying with a court order.

• Certain communication service providers that distribute licenses for a covered entity’s products and services also must ensure that these products and services are capable of providing information or data in an intelligible format.

• No new collection authorities.  The bill does not create any new collection authorities for the government to obtain communications.  The bill simply requires covered entities to ensure that the government’s lawfully-obtained evidence is readable—so that law enforcement can solve crimes and protect our communities from criminal and terrorist activities.

Source: Office of Senator Richard Burr

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On February 11, Director Rasmussen testified before the House Committee on Homeland Security at a hearing entitled, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror.”

A written copy of his prepared testimony is available here.

On February 12, he testified at a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Current Terrorist Threat to the United States.”

That testimony is available for review here.

Source: ODNI

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#1: The CIA’s use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.

#2: The CIA’s justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness.

#3: The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others.

#4: The conditions of confinement for CIA detainees were harsher than the CIA had represented to policymakers and others.

#5: The CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the Department ofJustice, impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

#6: The CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program.

#7: The CIA impeded effective White House oversight and decision-making.

#8: The CIA’s operation and management of the program complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies.

#9; The CIA impeded oversight by the CIA’s Office of Inspector General.

#10: The CIA coordinated the release of classified information to the media, including inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

#11: The CIA was unprepared as it began operating its Detention and Interrogation Program more than six months after being granted detention authorities.

#12: The CIA’s management and operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program was deeply flawed throughout the program’s duration, particularly so in 2002 and early 2003.

#13: Two contract psychologists devised the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and played a central role in the operation, assessments, and management of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. By 2005, the CIA had overwhelmingly outsourced operations related to the program.

#14: CIA detainees were subjected to coercive interrogation techniques that had not been approved by the Department of Justice or had not been authorized by CIA Headquarters.

#15: The CIA did not conduct a comprehensive or accurate accounting of the number of individuals it detained, and held individuals who did not meet the legal standard for detention. The CIA’s claims about the number of detainees held and subjected to its enhanced Interrogation techniques were inaccurate.

#16: The CIA failed to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques.

#17: The CIA rarely reprimanded or held personnel accountable for serious and significant violations, inappropriate activities, and systemic and individual management failures.

#18: The CIA marginalized and ignored numerous internal critiques, criticisms, and objections concerning the operation and management of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

#19: The CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program was inherently unsustainable and had effectively ended by 2006 due to unauthorized press disclosures, reduced cooperation from other nations, and legal and oversight concerns.

#20: The CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program damaged the United States’ standing in the world, and resulted in other significant monetary and non-monetary costs.

The full summary is available here.

Source: US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

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“Over the past several decades, and especially since the terrible tragedy of 9/11, the CIA has been at the forefront of our Nation’s campaign against al-Qa’ida and other terrorist organizations worldwide. The women and men of the CIA have operated around the globe, 24-hours-a-day, working with their U.S. colleagues as well as with foreign partners to prevent terrorist attacks. As a result of these efforts, including the many sacrifices made by CIA officers and their families, countless lives have been saved and our Homeland is more secure.

As part of the CIA’s global effort to dismantle al-Qa’ida and to prevent future terrorist attacks, the Agency was directed by President Bush six days after 9/11 to carry out a program to detain terrorist suspects around the world. Certain detainees were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs), which the Department of Justice determined at the time to be lawful and which were duly authorized by the Bush Administration. These techniques, which were last used by the CIA in December 2007, subsequently were prohibited by an Executive Order issued by President Obama when he took office in January 2009.

Today, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) released a redacted version of the Executive Summary, Findings, and Conclusions of its Study on CIA’s former detention and interrogation program, along with Minority Views and the Additional Views of a number of Committee members on the same subject. The CIA has also released its redacted June 2013 response to the Study, which is being posted on our website, www.cia.gov.

As noted in CIA’s response to the study, we acknowledge that the detention and interrogation program had shortcomings and that the Agency made mistakes. The most serious problems occurred early on and stemmed from the fact that the Agency was unprepared and lacked the core competencies required to carry out an unprecedented, worldwide program of detaining and interrogating suspected al-Qa’ida and affiliated terrorists. In carrying out that program, we did not always live up to the high standards that we set for ourselves and that the American people expect of us. As an Agency, we have learned from these mistakes, which is why my predecessors and I have implemented various remedial measures over the years to address institutional deficiencies.

Yet, despite common ground with some of the findings of the Committee’s Study, we part ways with the Committee on some key points. Our review indicates that interrogations of detainees on whom EITs were used did produce intelligence that helped thwart attack plans, capture terrorists, and save lives. The intelligence gained from the program was critical to our understanding of al-Qa’ida and continues to inform our counterterrorism efforts to this day.

We also disagree with the Study’s characterization of how CIA briefed the program to the Congress, various entities within the Executive Branch, and the public. While we made mistakes, the record does not support the Study’s inference that the Agency systematically and intentionally misled each of these audiences on the effectiveness of the program. Moreover, the process undertaken by the Committee when investigating the program provided an incomplete and selective picture of what occurred. As noted in the Minority views and in a number of additional views of Members, no interviews were conducted of any CIA officers involved in the program, which would have provided Members with valuable context and perspective surrounding these events.

Throughout its 67-year history, CIA has played a critical role keeping our Nation secure, and CIA officers are rightly proud and honored to be part of an organization that is indispensable to our national security. The numerous challenges on the world stage demand the full attention, focus, and capabilities of the women and men of the CIA so that our country can stay strong and our fellow Americans remain safe. To be successful, the CIA needs to work closely with its Congressional oversight committees as we confront these challenges.  With today’s release of Committee documents and the CIA response, we look forward to the way ahead.”

Related Documents:

• CIA’s June 2013 Response to the SSCI Study on the Former Detention and Interrogation Program [PDF 5.4MB]*
• CIA Fact Sheet Regarding the SSCI Study on the Former Detention and Interrogation Program

Source: Central Intelligence Agency

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“During her 30 years on the Committee, Renee has been integral to the committee’s oversight of the 16 intelligence agencies,” said Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), the chairman of the full committee, in the Congressional Record. “She led reviews of the intelligence community’s information technology modernization and classification processes, and served as a committee liaison with the inspectors general of the intelligence community. Her knowledge and insight helped both identify items of concern and proposals for improvement.”

Simpson’s military career began as an operations and readiness officer for Desert Shield/Desert Storm and her commitment to service led her to posts around the world, including to NATO’s Allied Forces Southern Headquarters Command; the U.S. Embassy in Rome, Italy; the Joint Task Force in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; U.S. Joint Forces Command; and the Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence in Washington, DC.

She has received numerous awards for her military service, including the Defense Superior Service Medal as well as many Navy and Marine Corps commendation and achievement medals.

“I am pleased to have the opportunity to publicly thank Renee and to note my appreciation for her dedicated and dignified efforts,” Sen. Feinstein concluded. “We will miss your insight and experience, and your commitment to pursuing the right policies to protect our nation.”

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